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Abstract
This paper presents a general mean-field game (GMFG) framework for simultaneous
learning and decision-making in stochastic games with a large population. It first
establishes the existence of a unique Nash Equilibrium to this GMFG, and explains that
naively combining Q-learning with the fixed-point approach in classical MFGs yields
unstable algorithms. It then proposes a Q-learning algorithm with Boltzmann policy
(GMF-Q), with analysis of convergence property and computational complexity. The
experiments on repeated Ad auction problems demonstrate that this GMF-Q algorithm
is efficient and robust in terms of convergence and learning accuracy. Moreover, its
performance is superior in convergence, stability, and learning ability, when compared
with existing algorithms for multi-agent reinforcement learning.
1 Introduction
Motivating example. This paper is motivated by the following Ad auction problem for
an advertiser. An Ad auction is a stochastic game on an Ad exchange platform among
a large number of players, the advertisers. In between the time a web user requests a
page and the time the page is displayed, usually within a millisecond, a Vickrey-type of
second-best-price auction is run to incentivize interested advertisers to bid for an Ad slot to
display advertisement. Each advertiser has limited information before each bid: first, her
own valuation for a slot depends on an unknown conversion of clicks for the item; secondly,
she, should she win the bid, only knows the reward after the user’s activities on the website
are finished. In addition, she has a budget constraint in this repeated auction.
The question is, how should she bid in this online sequential repeated game when there is
a large population of bidders competing on the Ad platform, with unknown distributions of
the conversion of clicks and rewards?
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Besides the Ad auction, there are many real-world problems involving a large number of
players and unknown systems. Examples include massive multi-player online role-playing
games [14], high frequency tradings [19], and the sharing economy [9].
Our work. Motivated by these problems, we consider a general framework of simultaneous
learning and decision-making in stochastic games with a large population. We formulate
a general mean-field-game (GMFG) with incorporation of action distributions, and with
unknown rewards and dynamics. This general framework can also be viewed as a generalized
version of MFGs of McKean-Vlasov type [1], which is a different paradigm from the classical
MFG. It is also beyond the scope of the existing Q-learning framework for Markov decision
problem (MDP) with unknown distributions, as MDP is technically equivalent to a single
player stochastic game.
On the theory front, this general framework differs from all existing MFGs. We establish
under appropriate technical conditions, the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium
(NE) to this GMFG. On the computational front, we show that naively combining Q-learning
with the three-step fixed-point approach in classical MFGs yields unstable algorithms. We then
propose a Q-learning algorithm with Boltzmann policy (GMF-Q), establish its convergence
property and analyze its computational complexity. Finally, we apply this GMF-Q algorithm
to the Ad auction problem, where this GMF-Q algorithm demonstrates its efficiency and
robustness in terms of convergence and learning. Moreover, its performance is superior, when
compared with existing algorithms for multi-agent reinforcement learning for convergence,
stability, and learning accuracy.
Related works. On learning large population games with mean-field approximations, [30]
focuses on inverse reinforcement learning for MFGs without decision making, [31] studies an
MARL problem with a first-order mean-field approximation term modeling the interaction
between one player and all the other finite players, and [17] and [32] consider model-based
adaptive learning for MFGs in specific models (e.g., linear-quadratic and oscillator games).
More recently, [25] considers reinforcement learning in the classical MFG setting, and proposes
a policy-gradient based algorithm and analyzes the so-called local NE. For learning large
population games without mean-field approximation, see [16, 10] and the references therein.
In the specific topic of learning auctions with a large number of advertisers, [4] and [15]
explore reinforcement learning techniques to search for social optimal solutions with real-word
data, and [13] uses MFGs to model the auction system with unknown conversion of clicks
within a Bayesian framework.
However, none of these works consider the problem of simultaneous learning and decision-
making in a general MFG framework. Neither do they establish the existence and uniqueness
of the NE, nor do they present model-free learning algorithms with complexity analysis and
convergence to the NE.
2
2 Framework of General MFG (GMFG)
2.1 Background: classical N-player Markovian game and MFG
Let us first recall the classical N -player game. There are N players in a game. At each step
t, the state of player i (= 1, 2, · · · , N) is sit ∈ S ⊆ Rd and she takes an action ait ∈ A ⊆ Rp.
Here d, p are positive integers, and S and A are compact (for example, finite) state space and
action space, respectively. Given the current state profile of N -players st = (s1t , . . . , sNt ) ∈ SN
and the action ait, player i will receive a reward ri(st, ait) and her state will change to sit+1
according to a transition probability function P i(st, ait).
A Markovian game further restricts the admissible policy/control for player i to be of the
form ait = piit(st). That is, piit : SN → P(A) maps each state profile s ∈ SN to a randomized
action, with P(X ) the space of probability measures on space X . The accumulated reward
(a.k.a. the value function) for player i, given the initial state profile s and the policy profile
sequence pi := {pi t}∞t=0 with pi t = (pi1t , . . . , piNt ), is then defined as
V i(s,pi) := E
[ ∞∑
t=0
γtri(st, a
i
t)
∣∣∣s0 = s] , (1)
where γ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, ait ∼ piit(st), and sit+1 ∼ P i(st, ait). The goal of each
player is to maximize her value function over all admissible policy sequences.
In general, this type of stochastic N -player game is notoriously hard to analyze, especially
when N is large. Mean field game (MFG), pioneered by [12] and [18], provides an ingenious
and tractable aggregation approach to approximate the otherwise challenging N -player
stochastic games. The basic idea for an MFG goes as follows. Assume all players are
identical, indistinguishable and interchangeable, when N → ∞, one can view the limit
of other players’ states s−it = (s1t , . . . , s
i−1
t , s
i+1
t , . . . , s
N
t ) as a population state distribution
µt := limN→∞
∑N
j=1,j 6=i 1(s
j
t )
N
. Due to the homogeneity of the players, one can then focus on a
single (representative) player. That is, in an MFG, one may consider instead the following
optimization problem,
maximizepi V (s,pi,µ) := E
[ ∞∑
t=0
γtr(st, at, µt)|s0 = s
]
subject to st+1 ∼ P (st, at, µt), at ∼ pit(st, µt),
where pi := {pit}∞t=0 denotes the policy sequence and µ := {µt}∞t=0 the distribution flow. In
this MFG setting, at time t, after the representative player chooses her action at according
to some policy pit, she will receive reward r(st, at, µt) and her state will evolve under a
controlled stochastic dynamics of a mean-field type P (·|st, at, µt). Here the policy pit depends
on both the current state st and the current population state distribution µt such that
pi : S × P(S)→ P(A).
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2.2 General MFG (GMFG)
In the classical MFG setting, the reward and the dynamic for each player are known. They
depend only on st the state of the player, at the action of this particular player, and µt the
population state distribution. In contrast, in the motivating auction example, the reward
and the dynamic are unknown; they rely on the actions of all players, as well as on st and µt.
We therefore define the following general MFG (GMFG) framework. At time t, after the
representative player chooses her action at according to some policy pi : S × P(S)→ P(A),
she will receive a reward r(st, at,Lt) and her state will evolve according to P (·|st, at,Lt),
where r and P are possibly unknown. The objective of the player is to solve the following
control problem:
maximizepi V (s,pi,L) := E
[ ∞∑
t=0
γtr(st, at,Lt)|s0 = s
]
subject to st+1 ∼ P (st, at,Lt), at ∼ pit(st,Lt).
(GMFG)
Here, L := {Lt}∞t=0, with Lt = Pst,at ∈ P(S × A) the joint distribution of the state and
the action (i.e., the population state-action pair). Lt has marginal distributions αt for the
population action and µt for the population state.
In this framework, we adopt the well-known Nash Equilibrium (NE) for analyzing stochastic
games.
Definition 2.1 (NE for GMFGs). In (GMFG), a player-population profile (pi?,L?) :=
({pi?t }∞t=0, {L?t}∞t=0) is called an NE if
1. (Single player side) Fix L?, for any policy sequence pi := {pit}∞t=0 and any initial state
s ∈ S,
V (s,pi?,L?) ≥ V (s,pi,L?) . (2)
2. (Population side) Pst,at = L?t for all t ≥ 0, where {st, at}∞t=0 is the dynamics under the
policy sequence pi? starting from s0 ∼ µ?0, with at ∼ pi?t (st, µ?t ), st+1 ∼ P (·|st, at,L?t ),
and µ?t being the population state marginal of L?t .
The single player side condition captures the optimality of pi?, when the population side is
fixed. The population side condition ensures the “consistency” of the solution: it guarantees
that the state and action distribution flow of the single player does match the population
state and action sequence L?.
2.3 Example: GMFG for the repeated auction
Now, consider the repeated Vickrey auction with a budget constraint in Section 1. Take
a representative advertiser in the auction. Denote st ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · , smax} as the budget of
this player at time t, where smax ∈ N+ is the maximum budget allowed on the Ad exchange
with a unit bidding price. Denote at as the bid price submitted by this player and αt as the
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bidding/(action) distribution of the population. The reward for this advertiser with bid at
and budget st is
rt = IwMt =1
[
(vt − aMt )− (1 + ρ)Ist<aMt (aMt − st)
]
. (3)
Here wMt takes values 1 and 0, with wMt = 1 meaning this player winning the bid and 0
otherwise. The probability of winning the bid would depend on M , the index for the game
intensity, and αt. (See discussion on M in Appendix H.1.) The conversion of clicks at time t
is vt and follows an unknown distribution. aMt is the value of the second largest bid at time t,
taking values from 0 to smax, and depends on both M and Lt. Should the player win the bid,
the reward rt consists of two parts, corresponding to the two terms in (3). The first term is
the profit of wining the auction, as the winner only needs to pay for the second best bid aM
in a Vickrey auction. The second term is the penalty of overshooting if the payment exceeds
her budget, with a penalty rate ρ. At each time t, the budget dynamics st follows,
st+1 =

st, w
M
t 6= 1,
st − aMt , wMt = 1 and aMt ≤ st,
0, wMt = 1 and aMt > st.
That is, if this player does not win the bid, the budget will remain the same. If she wins
and has enough money to pay, her budget will decrease from st to st − aMt . However, if she
wins but does not have enough money, her budget will be 0 after the payment and there will
be a penalty in the reward function. Note that in this game, both the rewards rt and the
dynamics st are unknown a priori.
In practice, one often modifies the dynamics of st+1 with a non-negative random budget
fulfillment ∆(st+1) after the auction clearing [8], such that
sˆt+1 = st+1 + ∆(st+1). (4)
One may see some particular choices of ∆(st+1) in the experiment section (Section 5).
3 Solution for GMFGs
We now establish the existence and uniqueness of the NE to (GMFG), by generalizing the
classical fixed-point approach for MFGs to this GMFG setting. (See [12] and [18] for the
classical case). It consists of three steps.
Step A. Fix L := {Lt}∞t=0, (GMFG) becomes the classical optimization problem. Indeed,
with L fixed, the population state distribution sequence µ := {µt}∞t=0 is also fixed, hence the
space of admissible policies is reduced to the single-player case. Solving (GMFG) is now
reduced to finding a policy sequence pi?t,L ∈ Π := {pi |pi : S → P(A)} over all admissible
pi = {pit}∞t=0, to maximize
V (s,pi,L) := E
[ ∞∑
t=0
γtr(st, at,Lt)|s0 = s
]
,
subject to st+1 ∼ P (st, at,Lt), at ∼ pit(st,Lt).
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Moreover, given this fixed L sequence and the solution pi?L := {pi?t,L}∞t=0, one can define a
mapping from the fixed population distribution sequence L to an arbitrarily chosen optimal
randomized policy sequence. That is,
Γ1 : {P(S ×A)}∞t=0 → {Π}∞t=0,
such that pi?L = Γ1(L). Note that this pi?L sequence satisfies the single player side condition
in Definition 2.1 for the population state-action pair sequence L. That is, V (s,pi?L,L) ≥
V (s,pi,L) , for any policy sequence pi = {pit}∞t=0 and any initial state s ∈ S.
As in the classical MFG literature [12], a feedback regularity (FR) condition is needed for
the analysis of Step A.
Assumption 1. There exists a constant d1 ≥ 0, such that for any L,L′ ∈ {P(S ×A)}∞t=0,
D(Γ1(L),Γ1(L′)) ≤ d1W1(L,L′), (5)
where
D(pi,pi ′) := sup
s∈S
W1(pi(s),pi ′(s)) = sup
s∈S
sup
t∈N
W1(pit(s), pi
′
t(s)),
W1(L,L′) := sup
t∈N
W1(Lt,L′t),
(6)
and W1 is the `1-Wasserstein distance between probability measures [7, 28, 23].
Step B. Based on the analysis in Step A and pi?L = {pi?t,L}∞t=0, update the initial sequence
L to L′ following the controlled dynamics P (·|st, at,Lt).
Accordingly, for any admissible policy sequence pi ∈ {Π}∞t=0 and a joint population state-
action pair sequence L ∈ {P(S ×A)}∞t=0, define a mapping Γ2 : {Π}∞t=0 × {P(S ×A)}∞t=0 →
{P(S ×A)}∞t=0 as follows:
Γ2(pi,L) := Lˆ = {Pst,at}∞t=0, (7)
where st+1 ∼ µtP (·|·, at,Lt), at ∼ pit(st), s0 ∼ µ0, and µt is the population state marginal of
Lt.
One needs a standard assumption in this step.
Assumption 2. There exist constants d2, d3 ≥ 0, such that for any admissible policy
sequences pi,pi1,pi2 and joint distribution sequences L,L1,L2,
W1(Γ2(pi1,L),Γ2(pi2,L)) ≤ d2D(pi1,pi2), (8)
W1(Γ2(pi,L1),Γ2(pi,L2)) ≤ d3W1(L1,L2). (9)
Assumption 2 can be reduced to Lipschitz continuity and boundedness of the transition
dynamics P . (See the Appendix for more details.)
6
Step C. Repeat Step A and Step B until L′ matches L.
This step is to take care of the population side condition. To ensure the convergence
of the combined step A and step B, it suffices if Γ : {P(S × A)}∞t=0 → {P(S × A)}∞t=0 is a
contractive mapping under the W1 distance, with Γ(L) := Γ2(Γ1(L),L). Then by the Banach
fixed point theorem and the completeness of the related metric spaces, there exists a unique
NE to the GMFG.
In summary, we have
Theorem 1 (Existence and Uniqueness of GMFG solution). Given Assumptions 1 and 2,
and assume d1d2 + d3 < 1. Then there exists a unique NE to (GMFG).
4 RL Algorithms for GMFGs
In this section, we design the computational algorithm for the GMFG. Since the reward
and transition distributions are unknown, this is simultaneously learning the system and
finding the NE of the game. We will focus on the case with finite state and action spaces,
i.e., |S|, |A| < ∞. We will look for stationary (time independent) NEs. Accordingly, we
abbreviate pi := {pi}∞t=0 and L : {L}∞t=0 as pi and L, respectively. This stationarity property
enables developing appropriate time-independent Q-learning algorithm, suitable for an infinite
time horizon game. Modification from the GMFG framework to this special stationary setting
is straightforward, and is left in the Appendix.
The algorithm consists of two steps, parallel to Step A and Step B in Section 3.
Step 1: Q-learning with stability for fixed L. With L fixed, it becomes a standard
learning problem for an infinite horizon MDP. We will focus on the Q-learning algorithm
[26, 24].
The Q-learning algorithm approximates the value iteration by stochastic approximation.
At each step with the state s and an action a, the system reaches state s′ according to the
controlled dynamics and the Q-function is updated according to
QL(s, a)← (1− βt(s, a))QL(s, a) + βt(s, a) [r(s, a,L) + γmaxa˜QL(s′, a˜)] , (10)
where the step size βt(s, a) can be chosen as ([5])
βt(s, a) =
{
|#(s, a, t) + 1|−h, (s, a) = (st, at),
0, otherwise.
with h ∈ (1/2, 1). Here #(s, a, t) is the number of times up to time t that one visits the
pair (s, a). The algorithm then proceeds to choose action a′ based on QL with appropriate
exploration strategies, including the -greedy strategy.
After obtaining the approximate Qˆ?L, in order to retrieve an approximately optimal policy,
it would be natural to define an argmax-e operator so that actions with equal maximum
Q-values would have equal probabilities to be selected. Unfortunately, the discontinuity
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and sensitivity of argmax-e could lead to an unstable algorithm (see Figure 4 for the
corresponding naive Algorithm 2 in Appendix). 1
Instead, we consider a Boltzmann policy based on the operator softmaxc : Rn → Rn,
defined as
softmaxc(x)i =
exp(cxi)∑n
j=1 exp(cxj)
. (11)
This operator is smooth and close to the argmax-e (see Lemma 7 in the Appendix). Moreover
even though Boltzmann policies are not optimal, the difference between the Boltzmann and
the optimal one can always be controlled by choosing the hyper-parameter c appropriately in
the softmax operator (11).
Step 2: error control in updating L. Given the sub-optimality of the Boltzmann policy,
one needs to characterize the difference between the optimal policy and the non-optimal ones.
In particular, one can define the action gap between the best action and the second best action
in terms of the Q-value as δs(L) := maxa′∈AQ?L(s, a′) − maxa/∈argmaxa∈AQ?L(s,a)Q?L(s, a) > 0.
Action gap is important for approximation algorithms [2], and are closely related to the
problem-dependent bounds for regret analysis in reinforcement learning and multi-armed
bandits, and advantage learning algorithms including A2C [20].
The problem is: in order for the learning algorithm to converge in terms of L (Theorem 2),
one needs to ensure a definite differentiation between the optimal policy and the sub-optimal
ones. This is problematic as the infimum of δs(L) over an infinite number of L can be 0. To
address this, the population distribution at step k, say Lk, needs to be projected to a finite
grid, called -net. The relation between the -net and action gaps is as follows:
For any  > 0, there exist a positive function φ() and an -net S := {L(1), . . . ,L(N)}
⊆ P(S × A), with the properties that mini=1,...,N dTV (L,L(i)) ≤  for any L ∈ P(S × A),
and that maxa′∈AQ?L(i)(s, a
′) − Q?L(i)(s, a) ≥ φ() for any i = 1, . . . , N, s ∈ S, and any
a /∈ argmaxa∈AQ?L(i)(s, a).
Here the existence of -nets is trivial due to the compactness of the probability simplex
P(S ×A), and the existence of φ() comes from the finiteness of the action set A.
In practice, φ() often takes the form of Dα with D > 0 and the exponent α > 0
characterizing the decay rate of the action gaps, and S takes a uniform grid with appropriate
grid sizes.
Finally, to enable Q-learning, it is assumed that one has access to a population simulator
(See [22, 29]). That is, for any policy pi ∈ Π, given the current state s ∈ S, for any
population distribution L, one can obtain the next state s′ ∼ P (·|s, pi(s, µ),L), a reward
r = r(s, pi(s, µ),L), and the next population distribution L′ = Ps′,pi(s′,µ). For brevity, we
denote the simulator as (s′, r,L′) = G(s, pi,L). Here µ is the state marginal distribution of L.
In summary, we propose the following Algorithm 1.
1argmax-e is not continuous: Let x = (1, 1), then argmax-e(x) = (1/2, 1/2). For any  > 0, let
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Algorithm 1 Q-learning for GMFGs (GMF-Q)
1: Input: Initial L0, tolerance  > 0.
2: for k = 0, 1, · · · do
3: Perform Q-learning for Tk iterations to find the approximate Q-function Qˆ?k(s, a) =
Qˆ?Lk(s, a) of an MDP with dynamics PLk(s
′|s, a) and rewards rLk(s, a).
4: Compute pik ∈ Π with pik(s) = softmaxc(Qˆ?k(s, ·)).
5: Sample s ∼ µk, where µk is the population state marginal of Lk, and obtain L˜k+1 from
G(s, pik,Lk).
6: Find Lk+1 = ProjS(L˜k+1)
7: end for
Here ProjS(L) = argminL(1),...,L(N)dTV (L(i),L). See Lemma 8 and Theorem 2 for details
about the choices of hyper-parameters c and Tk.
In the special case when the rewards rL and transition dynamics P (·|s, a,L) are known,
one can replace the Q-learning step in the above Algorithm 1 by a value iteration, resulting
in the GMF-V Algorithm 3 in the Appendix.
We next show the convergence of this GMF-Q algorithm (Algorithm 1) to an -Nash of
(GMFG), with complexity analysis.
Theorem 2 (Convergence and complexity of GMF-Q). Assume the same conditions in
Theorem 1 and Lemma 8 in the Appendix. For any tolerances , δ > 0, set δk = δ/K,η,
k = (k + 1)
−(1+η) for some η ∈ (0, 1] (k = 0, . . . , K,η − 1), Tk = TMLk (δk, k) (defined
in Lemma 8 in the Appendix) and c = log(1/)
φ()
. Then with probability at least 1 − 2δ,
W1(LK,η ,L?) ≤ C.
Moreover, the total number of iterations T =
∑K,η−1
k=0 T
MLk (δk, k) is bounded by
T = O
(
K
1+ 4
h
,η (log(K,η/δ))
2
1−h+
2
h
+3
)
. (12)
Here K,η :=
⌈
2 max
{
(η)−1/η, logd(/max{diam(S)diam(A), 1}) + 1)
}⌉
is the number of
outer iterations, h is the step-size exponent in Q-learning (defined in Lemma 8 in the
Appendix), and the constant C is independent of δ,  and η.
The proof of Theorem 2 in the Appendix depends on the Lipschitz continuity of the
softmax operator [6], the closeness between softmax and the argmax-e (Lemma 7 in the
Appendix), and the complexity of Q-learning for the MDP (Lemma 8 in the Appendix).
Lemma 8 also provides guidance on how to choose the number of inner iterations Tk in
Algorithm 1.
y = (1, 1− ), then argmax-e(y) = (1, 0).
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5 Experiment: repeated auction game
In this section, we report the performance of the proposed GMF-Q Algorithm. The objectives
of the experiments include 1) testing the convergence, stability, and learning ability of GMF-Q
in the GMFG setting, and 2) comparing GMF-Q with existing multi-agent reinforcement
learning algorithms, including IL algorithm and MF-Q algorithm.
We take the GMFG framework for the repeated auction game from Section 2.3. Here
each advertiser learns to bid in the auction with a budget constraint.
Parameters. The model parameters are set as: |S| = |A| = 10, the overbidding penalty
ρ = 0.2, the distributions of the conversion rate v ∼ uniform[4], and the competition intensity
index M = 5. The random fulfillment is chosen as: if s < smax, ∆(s) = 1 with probability 12
and ∆(s) = 0 with probability 1
2
; if s = smax, ∆(s) = 0.
The algorithm parameters are (unless otherwise specified): the temperature parameter
c = 4.0, the discount factor γ = 0.8, the parameter h from Lemma 8 in the Appendix being
h = 0.87, and the baseline inner iteration being 2000. Recall that for GMF-Q, both v and
the dynamics of P for s are unknown a priori. The 90%-confidence intervals are calculated
with 20 sample paths.
Performance evaluation in the GMFG setting. Our experiment shows that the GMF-
Q Algorithm is efficient and robust, and learns well.
Convergence and stability of GMF-Q. GMF-Q is efficient and robust. First, GMF-Q
converges after about 10 outer iterations; secondly, as the number of inner iterations increases,
the error decreases (Figure 2); and finally, the convergence is robust with respect to both the
change of number of states and the initial population distribution (Figure 3).
In contrast, the Naive algorithm does not converge even with 10000 inner iterations, and
the joint distribution Lt keeps fluctuating (Figure 4).
Learning accuracy of GMF-Q. GMF-Q learns well. Its learning accuracy is tested against
its special form GMF-V (Appendix G), with the latter assuming a known distribution of
conversation rate v and the dynamics P for the budget s. The relative L2 distance between
the Q-tables of these two algorithms is ∆Q := ‖QGMF-V−QGMF-Q‖2‖QGMF-V‖2 = 0.098879. This implies
that GMF-Q learns the true GMFG solution with 90-percent accuracy with 10000 inner
iterations.
The heatmap in Figure 1(a) is the Q-table for GMF-Q Algorithm after 20 outer iterations.
Within each outer iteration, there are TGMF-Qk = 10000 inner iterations. The heatmap in
Figure 1(b) is the Q-table for GMF-Q Algorithm after 20 outer iterations. Within each outer
iteration, there are TGMF-Vk = 5000 inner iterations.
Comparison with existing algorithms for N-player games. To test the effectiveness
of GMF-Q for approximating N -player games, we next compare GMF-Q with IL algorithm
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Table 1: Q-table with TGMF-Vk = 5000.
TGMF-Qk 1000 3000 5000 10000
∆Q 0.21263 0.1294 0.10258 0.0989
(a) GMF-Q. (b) GMF-V.
Figure 1: Q-tables: GMF-Q vs. GMF-V.
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Figure 2: Convergence with different
number of inner iterations.
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Figure 3: Convergence with different
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11
0 20 40 60 80 100
outer iteration
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
|
t
t+
1|
(a) fluctuation in l∞.
0 20 40 60 80 100
outer iteration
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
2.0
|
t
t+
1| 1
(b) fluctuation in l1.
Figure 4: Fluctuations of Naive Algorithm (30 sample paths).
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(a) |S| = |A| = 10, N = 20.
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(b) |S| = |A| = 20, N = 20.
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(c) |S| = |A| = 10, N = 40.
Figure 5: Learning accuracy based on C(pi).
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and MF-Q algorithm. IL algorithm [27] considers N independent players and each player
solves a decentralized reinforcement learning problem ignoring other players in the system.
The MF-Q algorithm [31] extends the NASH-Q Learning algorithm for the N -player game
introduced in [11], adds the aggregate actions (a¯−i =
∑
j 6=i aj
N−1 ) from the opponents, and works
for the class of games where the interactions are only through the average actions of N
players.
Performance metric. We adopt the following metric to measure the difference between a
given policy pi and an NE (here 0 > 0 is a safeguard, and is taken as 0.1 in the experiments):
C(pi) =
1
N |S|N
∑N
i=1
∑
s∈SN
maxpii Vi(s, (pi
−i, pii))− Vi(s,pi)
|maxpii Vi(s, (pi−i, pii))|+ 0 .
Clearly C(pi) ≥ 0, and C(pi∗) = 0 if and only if pi∗ is an NE. Policy arg maxpii Vi(s, (pi−i, pii))
is called the best response to pi−i. A similar metric without normalization has been adopted
in [21].
Our experiment (Figure 5) shows that GMF-Q is superior in terms of convergence rate,
accuracy, and stability for approximating an N -player game: GMF-Q converges faster than
IL and MF-Q, with the smallest error, and with the lowest variance, as -net improves the
stability.
For instance, when N = 20, IL Algorithm converges with the largest error 0.220. The
error from MF-Q is 0.101, smaller than IL but still bigger than the error from GMF-Q. The
GMF-Q converges with the lowest error 0.065. Moreover, as N increases, the error of GMF-Q
deceases while the errors of both MF-Q and IL increase significantly. As |S| and |A| increase,
GMF-Q is robust with respect to this increase of dimensionality, while both MF-Q and IL
clearly suffer from the increase of the dimensionality with decreased convergence rate and
accuracy. Therefore, GMF-Q is more scalable than IL and MF-Q, when the system is complex
and the number of players N is large.
6 Conclusion
This paper builds a GMFG framework for simultaneous learning and decision-making, es-
tablishes the existence and uniqueness of NE, and proposes a Q-learning algorithm GMF-Q
with convergence and complexity analysis. Experiments demonstrate superior performance of
GMF-Q.
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A Distance metrics and completeness
This section reviews some basic properties of the Wasserstein distance. It then proves that
the metrics defined in the main text are indeed distance functions and define complete metric
spaces.
`1-Wasserstein distance and dual representation. The `1 Wasserstein distance over
P(X ) for X ⊆ Rk is defined as
W1(ν, ν
′) := inf
M∈M(ν,ν′)
∫
X×X
‖x− y‖2dM(x, y). (13)
whereM(ν, ν ′) is the set of all measures (couplings) on X × X , with marginals ν and ν ′ on
the two components, respectively.
The Kantorovich duality theorem enables the following equivalent dual representation of
W1:
W1(ν, ν
′) = sup
‖f‖L≤1
∣∣∣∣∫X fdν −
∫
X
fdν ′
∣∣∣∣ , (14)
where the supremum is taken over all 1-Lipschitz functions f , i.e., f satisfying |f(x)−f(y)| ≤
‖x− y‖2 for all x, y ∈ X .
The Wasserstein distance W1 can also be related to the total variation distance via the
following inequalities [7]:
dmin(X )dTV (ν, ν ′) ≤ W1(ν, ν ′) ≤ diam(X )dTV (ν, ν ′), (15)
where dmin(X ) = minx 6=y∈X ‖x− y‖2, which is guaranteed to be positive when X is finite.
When S and A are compact, for any compact subset X ⊆ Rk, and for any ν, ν ′ ∈ P(X ),
W1(ν, ν
′) ≤ diam(X )dTV (ν, ν ′) ≤ diam(X ) < ∞, where diam(X ) = supx,y∈X ‖x − y‖2 and
dTV is the total variation distance. Moreover, one can verify
Lemma 3. Both D and W1 are distance functions, and they are finite for any input distri-
bution pairs. In addition, both ({Π}∞t=0, D) and ({P(S × A)}∞t=0,W1) are complete metric
spaces.
These facts enable the usage of Banach fixed-point mapping theorem for the proof of
existence and uniqueness (Theorems 1 and 4).
Proof of Lemma 3. It is known that for any compact set X ⊆ Rk, (P(X ),W1) defines
a complete metric space [3]. Since W1(ν, ν ′) ≤ diam(X ) is uniformly bounded for any
ν, ν ′ ∈ P(X ), we know that W1(L,L′) ≤ diam(X ) and D(pi,pi′) ≤ diam(X ) as well, so they
are both finite for any input distribution pairs. It is clear that they are distance functions
based on the fact that W1 is a distance function.
Finally, we show the completeness of the two metric spaces ({Π}∞t=0, D) and ({P(S ×
A)}∞t=0,W1). Take ({Π}∞t=0, D) for example. Suppose that pik is a Cauchy sequence in
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({Π}∞t=0, D). Then for any  > 0, there exists a positive integer N , such that for any
m, n ≥ N ,
D(pin,pim) ≤  =⇒ W1(pint (s), pimt (s)) ≤  for any s ∈ S, t ∈ N, (16)
which implies that pikt (s) forms a Cauchy sequence in (P(A),W1), and hence by the complete-
ness of (P(A),W1), pikt (s) converges to some pit(s) ∈ P(A). As a result, pin → pi ∈ {Π}∞t=0
under metric D, which shows that ({Π}∞t=0, D) is complete.
The completeness of ({P(S ×A)}∞t=0,W1) can be proved similarly.
The same argument for Lemma 3 shows that both D and W1 are distance functions
and are finite for any input distribution pairs, with both (Π, D) and (P(S ×A),W1) again
complete metric spaces.
B Existence and uniqueness for stationary NE of GMFGs
Definition B.1 (Stationary NE for GMFGs). In (GMFG), a player-population profile (pi?,
L?) is called a stationary NE if
1. (Single player side) For any policy pi and any initial state s ∈ S,
V (s, pi?,L?) ≥ V (s, pi,L?) . (17)
2. (Population side) Pst,at = L? for all t ≥ 0, where {st, at}∞t=0 is the dynamics under
the policy pi? starting from s0 ∼ µ?, with at ∼ pi?(st, µ?), st+1 ∼ P (·|st, at,L?), and µ?
being the population state marginal of L?.
The existence and uniqueness of the NE to (GMFG) in the stationary setting can be
established by modifying appropriately the same fixed-point approach for the GMFG in the
main text.
Step 1. Fix L, the GMFG becomes the classical optimization problem. That is, solving
(GMFG) is now reduced to finding a policy pi?L ∈ Π := {pi |pi : S → P(A)} to maximize
V (s, pi,L) := E
[ ∞∑
t=0
γtr(st, at,L)|s0 = s
]
,
subject to st+1 ∼ P (st, at,L), at ∼ pit(st,L).
Now given this fixed L and the solution pi?L to the above optimization problem, one can again
define
Γ1 : P(S ×A)→ Π,
such that pi?L = Γ1(L). Note that this pi?L satisfies the single player side condition for the
population state-action pair L,
V (s, pi?L,L) ≥ V (s, pi,L) , (18)
for any policy pi and any initial state s ∈ S.
Accordingly, a similar feedback regularity (FR) condition is needed in this step.
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Assumption 3. There exists a constant d1 ≥ 0, such that for any L,L′ ∈ P(S ×A),
D(Γ1(L),Γ1(L′)) ≤ d1W1(L,L′), (19)
where
D(pi, pi′) := sup
s∈S
W1(pi(s), pi
′(s)), (20)
and W1 is the `1-Wasserstein distance (a.k.a. earth mover distance) between probability
measures.
Step 2. Based on the analysis of Step 1 and pi?L, update the initial L to L′ following the
controlled dynamics P (·|st, at,L).
Accordingly, define a mapping Γ2 : Π× P(S ×A)→ P(S ×A) as follows:
Γ2(pi,L) := Lˆ = Ps1,a1 , (21)
where a1 ∼ pi(s1), s1 ∼ µP (·|·, a0,L), a0 ∼ pi(s0), s0 ∼ µ, and µ is the population state
marginal of L.
One also needs a similar assumption in this step.
Assumption 4. There exist constants d2, d3 ≥ 0, such that for any admissible policies
pi, pi1, pi2 and joint distributions L,L1,L2,
W1(Γ2(pi1,L),Γ2(pi2,L)) ≤ d2D(pi1, pi2), (22)
W1(Γ2(pi,L1),Γ2(pi,L2)) ≤ d3W1(L1,L2). (23)
Step 3. Repeat until L′ matches L.
This step is to ensure the population side condition. To ensure the convergence of the
combined step one and step two, it suffices if Γ : P(S × A) → P(S × A) with Γ(L) :=
Γ2(Γ1(L),L) is a contractive mapping (under the W1 distance).
Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, again by the Banach fixed point theorem and the
completeness of the related metric spaces, there exists a unique stationary NE of the GMFG.
That is,
Theorem 4 (Existence and Uniqueness of stationary MFG solution). Given Assumptions 3
and 4, and assume d1d2 + d3 < 1. Then there exists a unique stationary NE to (GMFG).
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C Additional comments on assumptions
As mentioned in the main text, the single player side Assumption 1 and its counterpart
Assumption 3 for the stationary version correspond to the feedback regularity (FR) condition
in the classical MFG literature. Here we add some comments on the population side
Assumption 2 and its stationary version Assumption 4. For simplicity and clarity, let us
consider the stationary case with finite state and action spaces. Then we have the following
result.
Lemma 5. Suppose that maxs,a,L,s′ P (s′|s, a,L) ≤ c1, and that P (s′|s, a, ·) is c2-Lipschitz in
W1, i.e.,
|P (s′|s, a,L1)− P (s′|s, a,L2)| ≤ c2W1(L1,L2). (24)
Then in Assumption 4, d2 and d3 can be chosen as
d2 =
2diam(S)diam(A)|S|c1
dmin(A) (25)
and d3 = diam(S)diam(A)c22 , respectively.
Lemma 5 provides an explicit characterization of the population side assumptions based
only on the boundedness and Lipschitz properties of the transition dynamics P . In particular,
c1 becomes smaller when the transition dynamics becomes more diverse and the state space
becomes larger.
Proof. (Lemma 5) We begin by noticing that L′ = Γ2(pi,L) can be expanded and computed
as follows:
µ′(s′) =
∑
s∈S,a∈A
µ(s)P (s′|s, a,L)pi(s, a), L′(s′, a′) = µ′(s′)pi(s′, a′), (26)
where µ is the state marginal distribution of L.
Now by the inequalities (15), we have
W1(Γ2(pi1,L),Γ2(pi2,L)) ≤ diam(S ×A)dTV (Γ2(pi1,L),Γ2(pi2,L))
=
diam(S ×A)
2
∑
s′∈S,a′∈A
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
s∈S,a∈A
µ(s)P (s′|s, a,L) (pi1(s, a)pi1(s′, a′)− pi2(s, a)pi2(s′, a′))
∣∣∣∣∣
≤diam(S ×A)
2
max
s,a,L,s′
P (s′|s, a,L)
∑
s,a,s′,a′
µ(s)(pi1(s, a) + pi2(s, a))|pi1(s′, a′)− pi2(s′, a′)|
≤diam(S ×A)
2
max
s,a,L,s′
P (s′|s, a,L)
∑
s′,a′
|pi1(s′, a′)− pi2(s′, a′)| · (1 + 1)
=2diam(S ×A) max
s,a,L,s′
P (s′|s, a,L)
∑
s′
dTV (pi1(s
′), pi2(s′))
≤2diam(S ×A) maxs,a,L,s′ P (s
′|s, a,L)|S|
dmin(A) D(pi1, pi2) =
2diam(S)diam(A)|S|c1
dmin(A) D(pi1, pi2).
(27)
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Similarly, we have
W1(Γ2(pi,L1),Γ2(pi,L2)) ≤ diam(S ×A)dTV (Γ2(pi,L1),Γ2(pi,L2))
=
diam(S ×A)
2
∑
s′∈S,a′∈A
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
s∈S,a∈A
µ(s)pi(s, a)pi(s′, a′) (P (s′|s, a,L1)− P (s′|s, a,L2))
∣∣∣∣∣
≤diam(S ×A)
2
∑
s,a,s′,a′
µ(s)pi(s, a)pi(s′, a′) |P (s′|s, a,L1)− P (s′|s, a,L2)|
≤diam(S)diam(A)c2
2
.
(28)
This completes the proof.
D Proof of Theorems 1 and 4
For notational simplicity, we only present the proof for the stationary case (Theorem 4). The
proof of Theorems 1 is the same with appropriate notational changes.
First by Definition B.1 and the definitions of Γi (i = 1, 2), (pi,L) is a stationary NE iff
L = Γ(L) = Γ2(Γ1(L),L) and pi = Γ1(L), where Γ(L) = Γ2(Γ1(L),L). This indicates that
for any L1,L2 ∈ P(S ×A),
W1(Γ(L1),Γ(L2)) = W1(Γ2(Γ1(L1),L1),Γ2(Γ1(L2),L2))
≤ W1(Γ2(Γ1(L1),L1),Γ2(Γ1(L2),L1)) +W1(Γ2(Γ1(L2),L1),Γ2(Γ1(L2),L2))
≤ (d1d2 + d3)W1(L1,L2).
(29)
And since d1d2 +d3 ∈ [0, 1), by the Banach fixed-point theorem, we conclude that there exists
a unique fixed-point of Γ, or equivalently, a unique stationary MFG solution to (GMFG).
E Proof of Theorem 2
The proof of Theorem 2 relies on the following lemmas.
Lemma 6 ([6]). The softmax function is c-Lipschitz, i.e., ‖softmaxc(x)− softmaxc(y)‖2 ≤
c‖x− y‖2 for any x, y ∈ Rn.
Notice that for a finite set X ⊆ Rk and any two (discrete) distributions ν, ν ′ over X , we
have
W1(ν, ν
′) ≤ diam(X )dTV (ν, ν ′) = diam(X )
2
‖ν − ν ′‖1 ≤ diam(X )
2
‖ν − ν ′‖2, (30)
where in computing the `1-norm, ν, ν ′ are viewed as vectors of length |X |.
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Hence Lemma 6 implies that for any x, y ∈ R|X |, when softmaxc(x) and softmaxc(y)
are viewed as probability distributions over X , we have
W1(softmaxc(x), softmaxc(y)) ≤ diam(X )c
2
‖x− y‖2 ≤ diam(X )
√|X |c
2
‖x− y‖∞.
Lemma 7. The distance between the softmax and the argmax mapping is bounded by
‖softmaxc(x)− argmax-e(x)‖2 ≤ 2n exp(−cδ),
where δ = xmax −maxxj<xmax xj, xmax = maxi=1,...,n xi, and δ :=∞ when all xj are equal.
Similar to Lemma 6, Lemma 7 implies that for any x ∈ R|X |, viewing softmaxc(x) as
probability distributions over X leads to
W1(softmaxc(x), argmax-e(x)) ≤ diam(X )|X | exp(−cδ).
Proof of Lemma 7. Without loss of generality, assume that x1 = x2 = · · · = xm = maxi=1,...,n xi =
x? > xj for all m < j ≤ n. Then
argmax-e(x)i =
{
1
m
, i ≤ m,
0, otherwise.
softmaxc(x)i =

ecx
?
mecx?+
∑n
j=m+1 e
cxj , i ≤ m,
ecxi
mecx?+
∑n
j=m+1 e
cxj , otherwise.
Therefore
‖softmaxc(x)− argmax-e(x)‖2 ≤ ‖softmaxc(x)− argmax-e(x)‖1
=m
(
1
m
− e
cx?
mecx? +
∑n
j=m+1 e
cxj
)
+
∑n
i=m+1 e
cxi
mecx? +
∑n
j=m+1 e
cxj
=
2
∑n
i=m+1 e
cxi
mecx? +
∑n
i=m+1 e
cxi
=
2
∑n
i=m+1 e
−cδi
m+
∑n
i=m+1 e
−cδi
≤ 2
m
n∑
i=m+1
e−cδi ≤ 2(n−m)
m
e−cδ ≤ 2ne−cδ,
with δi = xi − x?.
Lemma 8 ([5]). For an MDP, sayM, suppose that the Q-learning algorithm takes step-sizes
βt(s, a) =
{
|#(s, a, t) + 1|−h, (s, a) = (st, at),
0, otherwise.
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with h ∈ (1/2, 1). Here #(s, a, t) is the number of times up to time t that one visits the
state-action pair (s, a). Also suppose that the covering time of the state-action pairs is bounded
by L with probability at least 1 − p for some p ∈ (0, 1). Then ‖QTM(δ,) − Q?‖∞ ≤  with
probability at least 1− 2δ. Here QT is the T -th update in Q-learning, and Q? is the (optimal)
Q-function, given that
TM(δ,) = Ω
(L logp(δ)
β
log
Vmax

) 1
1−h
+
(L logp(δ))1+3h V 2max log
(
|S||A|Vmax
δβ
)
β22

1
h
 ,
where β = (1 − γ)/2, Vmax = Rmax/(1 − γ), and Rmax is an upper bound on the extreme
difference between the expected rewards, i.e., maxs,a,µ r(s, a, µ)−mins,a,µ r(s, a, µ) ≤ Rmax.
Here the covering time L of a state-action pair sequence is defined to be the number of
steps needed to visit all state-action pairs starting from any arbitrary state-action pair, and
TM(δ, ) is the number of inner iterations Tk set in Algorithm 1. This will guarantee the
convergence in Theorem 2. Also notice that the l∞ norm above is defined in an element-wise
sense, i.e., for M ∈ R|S|×|A|, we have ‖M‖∞ = maxs∈S,a∈A |M(s, a)|.
Proof of Theorem 2. Define Γˆk1(L) := softmaxc
(
Qˆ?Lk
)
. In the following, pi = softmaxc(QL)
is understood as the policy pi with pi(s) = softmaxc(QL(s, ·)). Let L? be the population
state-action pair in a stationary NE of (GMFG). Then pik = Γˆk1(Lk). Denoting d := d1d2 +d3,
we see
W1(L˜k+1,L?) = W1(Γ2(pik,Lk),Γ2(Γ1(L?),L?))
≤W1(Γ2(Γ1(Lk),Lk),Γ2(Γ1(L?),L?)) +W1(Γ2(Γ1(Lk),Lk),Γ2(Γˆk1(Lk),Lk))
≤W1(Γ(Lk),Γ(L?)) + d2D(Γ1(Lk), Γˆk1(Lk))
≤(d1d2 + d3)W1(Lk,L?) + d2D(argmax-e(Q?Lk), softmaxc(Qˆ?Lk))
≤dW1(Lk,L?) + d2D(softmaxc(Qˆ?Lk), softmaxc(Q?Lk))
+ d2D(argmax-e(Q?Lk), softmaxc(Q
?
Lk))
≤dW1(Lk,L?) + cd2diam(A)
√|A|
2
‖Qˆ?µk −Q?µk‖∞
+ d2D(argmax-e(Q?Lk), softmaxc(Q
?
Lk)).
Then since Lk ∈ S by the projection step, Lemma 7, and Lemma 8 with the choice of
Tk = T
Mµ(δk, k)), we have, with probability at least 1− 2δk,
W1(L˜k+1,L?) ≤ dW1(Lk,L?) + cd2diam(A)
√|A|
2
k + d2diam(A)|A|e−cφ(). (31)
Finally, it is clear that with probability at least 1− 2δk,
W1(Lk+1,L?) ≤ W1(L˜k+1,L?) +W1(L˜k+1,ProjS(L˜k+1))
≤ dW1(Lk,L?) + cd2diam(A)
√|A|
2
k + d2diam(A)|A|e−cφ() + .
23
By telescoping, this implies that with probability at least 1− 2∑K−1k=0 δk,
W1(LK ,L?) ≤dKW1(L0,L?) + cd2diam(A)
√|A|
2
K−1∑
k=0
dK−kk
+
(d2diam(A)|A|e−cφ() + )(1− dK)
1− d .
(32)
Since k is summable, hence supk≥0 k < ∞),
∑K−1
k=0 d
K−kk ≤
supk≥0 k
1− d d
b(K−1)/2c +∑∞
k=d(K−1)/2e k.
Now plugging in K = K,η, with the choice of δk and c = log(1/)φ() , and noticing that
d ∈ [0, 1), it is clear that with probability at least 1− 2δ,
W1(LK,η ,L?) ≤dK,ηW1(L0,L?)
+
cd2diam(A)
√|A|
2
supk≥0 k
1− d d
b(K,η−1)/2c +
∞∑
k=d(K,η−1)/2e
k

+
(d2diam(A)|A|+ 1)
1− d .
(33)
Setting k = (k + 1)−(1+η), then when K,η ≥ 2(logd + 1),
supk≥0 k
1− d d
b(K,η−1)/2c ≤ 
1− d.
Similarly, when K,η ≥ 2(η)−1/η,
∑∞
k=
⌈
K,η−1
2
⌉ k ≤ .
Finally, when K,η ≥ logd(/(diam(S)diam(A))), dK,ηW1(L0,L?) ≤ , sinceW1(L0,L?) ≤
diam(S ×A)= diam(S)diam(A).
In summary, if K,η = d2 max{(η)−1/η, logd(/max{diam(S)diam(A), 1}) + 1}e, then
with probability at least 1− 2δ,
W1(LK,η ,L?) ≤
(
1 +
cd2diam(A)
√|A|(2− d)
2(1− d) +
(d2diam(A)|A|+ 1)
1− d
)
 = O().
Finally, plugging in k and δk into TML(δk, k), and noticing that k ≥ K,η and
∑K,η−1
k=0 (k+
1)α ≤ Kα+1,η
α+1
, it is immediate that
T = O
(log(K,η/δ)) 11−h K,η (logK,η) 11−h + (log(K,η/δ)) 1h+3 K1+ 2(1+η)h,η
1 + 2(1+η)
h
(log(K,η/δ))
1
h
 .
By further relaxing η to 1 and merging the terms, (12) follows.
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F Naive algorithm
The Naive iterative algorithm (Algorithm 2) is to replace Step A in the three-step fixed-point
approach of GMFGs with Q-learning iterations. The limitation of this Naive algorithm has
been discussed in the main text (Step 1, Section 4) and empirically verified in Section 5
(Figure 4).
Algorithm 2 Alternating Q-learning for GMFGs (Naive)
1: Input: Initial population state-action pair L0
2: for k = 0, 1, · · · do
3: Perform Q-learning to find the Q-function Q?k(s, a) = Q?Lk(s, a) of an MDP with
dynamics PLk(s′|s, a) and rewards rLk(s, a).
4: Solve pik ∈ Π with pik(s) = argmax-e (Q?k(s, ·)).
5: Sample s ∼ µk, where µk is the population state marginal of Lk, and obtain Lk+1 from
G(s, pik, Lk).
6: end for
G GMF-V
GMF-V, briefly mentioned in Section 4, is the value-iteration version of our main algorithm
GMF-Q. GMF-V applies to the GMFG setting with fully known transition dynamics P and
rewards r.
Algorithm 3 Value Iteration for GMFGs (GMF-V)
1: Input: Initial L0, tolerance  > 0.
2: for k = 0, 1, · · · do
3: Perform value iteration for Tk iterations to find the approximate Q-function QLk and
value function VLk :
4: for t = 1, 2, · · · , Tk do
5: for all s ∈ S and s ∈ A do
6: QLk(s, a)← E[r(s, a, Lk)] + γ
∑
s′ P (s
′|s, a, Lk)VLk(s′)
7: VLk(s)← maxaQLk(s, a)
8: end for
9: end for
10: Compute a policy pik ∈ Π:
pik(s) = softmaxc(QLk(s, ·)).
11: Sample s ∼ µk, where µk is the population state marginal of Lk, and obtain L˜k+1 from
G(s, pik, Lk).
12: Find Lk+1 = ProjS(L˜k+1)
13: end for
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H More details for the experiments
H.1 Competition intensity index M .
In the experiment, the competition index M is interpreted and implemented as the number
of selected players in each auction competition. That is, in each round, M − 1 players will be
randomly selected from the population to compete with the representative advertiser for the
auction. Therefore, the population distribution Lt, the winner indicator wMt , and second-best
price aMt all depend on M . This parameter M is also referred to as the auction thickness in
the auction literature [13].
H.2 Adjustment for Algorithm MF-Q.
For MF-Q, [31] assumes all N players have a joint state s. In the auction experiment, we make
the following adjustment for MF-Q for computational efficiency and model comparability:
each player i makes decision based on her own private state and table Qi is a functional of si,
ai and
∑
j 6=i a
j
N−1 .
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